The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism by Cruz, David B.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 19 | Issue 3 Article 7
The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical
Federalism
David B. Cruz
Copyright c 2011 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
805 (2011), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol19/iss3/7
THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT AND
UNCATEGORICAL FEDERALISM
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ABSTRACT
This Essay addresses federalism objections to section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA).  Ordinarily, the federal government accepts states’ determinations of
what couples are validly married.  Section 3 of DOMA, however, fashions a broad
exception for same-sex couples, who are definitionally deemed not to be in “mar-
riages.”  In addition to equal protection and full faith and credit challenges to DOMA,
litigants have made constitutional federalism arguments.  In Massachusetts v. United
States Department of Health and Human Services, the federal trial court accepted one
such argument, though in a form that might be read to categorically deny the federal
government authority over marriage.  This Essay critiques such categorical federalism
arguments, as well as the district court’s specific doctrinal argument, and offers a more
nuanced, uncategorical federalism argument against DOMA section 3 based on ex-
isting constitutional precedents, an argument that relies on a confluence of factors to
conclude that this provision of federal law is unconstitutional.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. movement for marriage equality for same-sex couples has of late seen
numerous victories.  Since 2004, Massachusetts, Iowa, Connecticut, Vermont, and New
Hampshire, as well as the District of Columbia, have all allowed same-sex couples to
marry civilly.1  Other states such as New York and Maryland recognize marriages of
same-sex couples validly entered in other jurisdictions.2
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. I am grateful
to the audience at my presentation of some of these arguments at the American Bar Association
2008 Mid-Year Meeting, to Mary Bonauto, Mary Anne Case, and Steve Greene for conver-
sations (and some disagreements) about these points, and to Paul Moura for excellent research
assistance. Mistakes and omissions of course remain my responsibility. Copyright © David B.
Cruz 2011, all rights reserved.
1 See H.B. 436, 2009 Leg., 161st Sess. (N.H. 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 906–07 (Iowa 2009);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); Keith L. Alexander &
Ann E. Marimow, For Gays, A D.C. Day to Treasure, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2010, at A1; Abby
Goodnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A1.
2 See Aaron C. Davis & John Wagner, Md. To Recognize Gay Marriages from Other
Places, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2010, at A1; Jeremy W. Peters, New York Backs Same-Sex
Unions From Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A1.
805
806 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:805
Despite this progress, one significant barrier to equality for same-sex couples
remains the so-called Defense of Marriage Act3 or “DOMA.”  Adopted by Congress
in 1996, DOMA contains two operative provisions.  Section 2 of the Act purports to
authorize states to refuse to recognize marriages of same-sex couples from other states.4 
Section 3 of DOMA defines “marriage” for most federal law purposes to “mean[ ]
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word ‘spouse’ [to] refer[ ] only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
a wife.”5
In the view of many scholars, DOMA is unconstitutional.  Section 2’s interstate
nonrecognition authorization has been argued to exceed Congress’s power to enforce
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution6 by purporting to grant authority
to states to deny any effect to such marriages from other states in a profoundly anti-
Union fashion.7  Moreover, both section 2 and section 3 with its federal definition of
“marriage” have been persuasively argued to violate constitutional equal protection
principles.8  In addition, section 3 has been attacked on Tenth Amendment/constitu-
tional federalism grounds.9
3 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2006)).
4 Id. § 2 provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a mar-
riage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe,
or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
5 Id. § 3.
6 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, and sometimes separately
designated Effects Clause, provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Id.
7 See Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 43–46 (1996) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of
Jurisprudence, Univ. of Chi.); Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to Edward M. Kennedy (May 24,
1996) [hereinafter Tribe Letter], in 142 CONG. REC. S5931 (1996); cf. Andrew Koppelman,
Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV.
1, 18 (1997) (addressing § 3 and arguing “that Congress probably has no power to do what it
has done in DOMA”).
8 See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 7, at 9 (“Because the invidious intent that is inferable
under Romer [v. Evans and its equal protection analysis] infects both provisions of [DOMA],
the entire statute is unconstitutional.”).
9 See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint
and in Support of Commonwealth’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Massachusetts v.
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On July 8, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
held in two different lawsuits that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional in cer-
tain of its applications.  In Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,10 a case brought
by married same-sex couples and surviving members thereof, Judge Tauro held that
DOMA’s denial of certain federal benefits to same-sex couples violated equal protec-
tion.11  In Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and Human Services,12
the same judge held that section 3 also violated constitutional federalism limitations
embodied in the Tenth Amendment because “the authority to regulate marital status
is a sovereign attribute of statehood.”13  I believe that Judge Tauro was correct to con-
clude in Gill that section 3 of DOMA violates equal protection.14  However, his rather
categorical federalism approach in Massachusetts is problematic.  This Essay cri-
tiques such categorical approaches to the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty and
offers instead a more nuanced, uncategorical approach relying not on “traditional
governmental functions” analysis15 but instead on the coincidence of a number of
factors arguably rendering DOMA section 3 improper on federalism grounds.
First, however, a brief note about the scope of this project.  I am not herein advo-
cating my view about the best way to approach constitutional federalism.  I subscribe
to a view of federalism different from those predominating in the Supreme Court of
late, one that attaches great consequence to the Civil War and the irregular process
by which the Fourteenth Amendment was imposed upon the southern states.16  In my
view, United States courts generally have inadequately grappled with the transfor-
mation in federal-state relations flowing from the war and Reconstruction.  But there
are federalism arguments that can be made against section 3 of DOMA in light of the
current judicial adherence to dual sovereignty,17 and those are what I explicate in the
second Part of this Essay.
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-
cv-11156-JLT), 2010 WL 581804 (“DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which prohibits Congress from intruding on areas of exclusive State authority,
of which the definition and regulation of marriage is perhaps the clearest example.”).
10 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
11 Id. at 387.
12 698 F. Supp. 2d 243.
13 Id. at 251. This decision also held that Section 3 was an impermissible exercise of
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, though this holding depended
on the court’s conclusion in Gill that DOMA violated equal protection principles. Id. at 248–49.
14 See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387; see also Koppelman, supra note 7, at 24–32.
15 Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
16 See generally Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism,
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003)
(arguing federalism principles must be viewed in light of the conditions surrounding the Civil
War and Reconstruction to reach a true reading of constitutional structure).
17 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (avowing that “the
Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
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Part I of this Essay examines the district court opinion in Massachusetts v. United
States Department of Health and Human Services and its reliance on the notion that
our constitutional federalism arrangements deny the federal government authority over
marriage.  Although this argument attempts to build upon Supreme Court and Circuit
Court federalism precedents, it overreads those precedents, and its seeming reliance
on a categorical federalism argument is problematic.
But somewhat related federalism arguments can be made against section 3 of
DOMA in light of the current case law without recourse to a categorical claim that the
federal government simply lacks authority over a particular sphere of activity such
as marriage.  Part II of the Essay further critiques the district court’s more categorical
federalism arguments but explicates how the confluence of several factors could be
argued to invalidate DOMA’s section 3 on constitutional federalism grounds without
recourse to a categorical claim of federal regulatory disability.
I. MASSACHUSETTS V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES AND CATEGORICAL FEDERALISM ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECTION 3 OF
DOMA
In July of 2009, the Attorney General of Massachusetts sued the United States
Department of Health and Human Services in federal district court,18 arguing that
section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional as applied to Massachusetts and its residents,19
violating the Tenth Amendment.20  In particular, the complaint alleged that “Congress
lacks the authority under Article I of the United States Constitution to regulate the
field of domestic relations, including marriage.”21  In its motion for summary judg-
ment, Massachusetts argued that “States have the exclusive sovereign prerogative to
define and regulate marriage.”22  Massachusetts’s argument was categorical:
DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
which prohibits Congress from intruding on areas of exclusive
State authority, of which the definition and regulation of marriage
457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sov-
ereignty between the States and the Federal Government. This Court also has recognized this
fundamental principle.”).
18 Martin Finucane, Mass. Challenges Federal Defense of Marriage Act, BOS. GLOBE
(July 8, 2009, 3:23 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2009/07/mass_to
_challen.html.
19 Complaint at 1, Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT).
20 Id. at 22.
21 Id.; see also id. at 3 (“Section 3 of DOMA exceeds congressional authority and inter-
feres with the Commonwealth’s sovereign authority to define marriage, in violation of the
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Congress’s Article I powers, and the
Constitution’s principles of federalism.”).
22 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint &
in Support of Commonwealth’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 9, at 13.
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is perhaps the clearest example.  Contrary to Defendants’ argu-
ments, the States’ authority to define marriage is not limited to
application under State law.  Rather, the Commonwealth—like all
States—has the authority to issue marriage licenses that determine
marital status for all purposes, State and federal.23
District Judge Joseph Tauro agreed.24  As he framed the core federalism issue,
the “case require[d] a complex constitutional inquiry into whether the power to estab-
lish marital status determinations lies exclusively with the state, or whether Congress
may siphon off a portion of that traditionally state-held authority for itself.”25  Judge
Tauro recognized that a Tenth Amendment violation would occur if Congress pur-
ported to pass a law beyond the authority delegated it by the Constitution (because that
Amendment reserves to the states those powers not granted to Congress).26  Besides
concluding that DOMA section 3 was not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under
the Spending Clause of the Constitution,27 on which the government had relied,28
Judge Tauro further concluded that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional because
it invaded states’ authority to regulate domestic relations.29
The district court’s categorical argument that Congress cannot regulate domestic
relations was perhaps stronger than its lack of enumerated power argument as a way
of defending the conclusion that DOMA violated constitutional federalism principles. 
Judge Tauro’s argument rejecting the Spending Clause as a basis for Section 3 of
DOMA depended upon his conclusion in the companion case Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management that DOMA violated equal protection in its discriminatory
treatment of same-sex couples30 and that conditioning participation in federal programs
on compliance with DOMA unconstitutionally induced states to violate equal protec-
tion.31  Gill, in turn, held that DOMA had no rational basis (as applied to the plaintiff
same-sex couples and survivors in Massachusetts) because Judge Tauro concluded
that the federal government has no “interest in a uniform definition of marriage for
purposes of determining federal rights, benefits, and privileges.”32  The authority
23 Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
24 Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (“The Commonwealth contends that DOMA
violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, by intruding on areas of exclusive state
authority, as well as the Spending Clause, by forcing the Commonwealth to engage in in-
vidious discrimination against its own citizens in order to receive and retain federal funds in
connection with two joint federal-state programs. . . . [T]his court agrees . . . .”).
25 Id. at 245.
26 Id. at 246–47.
27 Id. at 248–49.
28 Id. at 247.
29 See id. at 249.
30 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010).
31 Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
32 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
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Tauro gives for that conclusion, besides his related categorical conclusion that “the
subject of domestic relations is the exclusive province of the states[,]”33 is his opinion
in Massachusetts.34  Thus, in a somewhat circular way, Judge Tauro’s categorical fed-
eralism arguments are key to both his decisions holding the federal definition section
of DOMA unconstitutional as applied to and in Massachusetts.
Those categorical federalism arguments are, however, deeply problematic, as ex-
plicated further in Part II.  Even on its own terms, however, Judge Tauro’s legal rea-
soning on this point is unpersuasive.  Admitting that “Tenth Amendment caselaw does
not provide much guidance,”35 the opinion in Massachusetts turned to United States
v. Bongiorno,36 a 1997 decision from the First Circuit not cited by Massachusetts in
its motion for summary judgment, to extract a doctrinal test to govern Massachusetts’s
challenge to DOMA.37  The reliance on Bongiorno is surprising, for that case involved
an unsuccessful Tenth Amendment challenge to the federal Child Support Recovery
Act (CSRA).38  In particular, the defendant there argued “that the CSRA [fell] be-
yond Congress’ competence because it concerns domestic relations (an area tradition-
ally within the states’ domain).”39  But the Court of Appeals “reject[ed] the claim out
of hand.”40  Bongiorno thus is an inauspicious basis for a decision arguing that an act
passed by Congress (DOMA) is unconstitutional (again under the Tenth Amendment)
because it regulates in the area of domestic relations (specifically, marriage).
The First Circuit panel judges in Bongiorno adhered to the view that the Tenth
Amendment does not reserve certain matters to the state thereby cutting off otherwise
valid exercises of federal power.41  Rather, following Supreme Court precedent, the
Court of Appeals held in Bongiorno that the Tenth Amendment “is not applicable to
situations in which Congress properly exercises its authority under an enumerated con-
stitutional power.”42  The question for Judge Tauro under established circuit doctrine
thus should have been whether DOMA section 3 is a proper exercise of a power or
powers allocated to Congress by the Constitution.
In Massachusetts, the federal government argued that section 3 of DOMA was an
exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution.43  That
33 Id.
34 Id. at 391 n.121 (providing a “see, generally,” cite to Massachusetts).
35 Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 252. Judge Tauro’s statement was more narrowly
limited to the third prong of the test he chose to apply, see id., but is true more generally.
36 106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997).
37 Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
38 Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1033–34. The Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 228 (2006).
39 Id. at 1033.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
43 Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 247. The Spending Clause provides that “[t]he
Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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might theoretically be sufficient to sustain section 3 in litigation attacking its constitu-
tionality on the ground that Congress lacked an enumerated power allowing DOMA
to apply to federal assistance programs, such as Medicaid and the State Cemetery
Grants Program challenged in Massachusetts.44  But it is patently inadequate to sup-
port DOMA in a facial challenge, for as the district court noted:
DOMA’s reach is not limited to provisions relating to federal
spending.  The broad sweep of DOMA, potentially affecting the
application of 1,138 federal statutory provisions in the United
States Code in which marital status is a factor, impacts, among
other things, copyright protections, provisions relating to leave to
care for a spouse under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and
testimonial privileges.45
Accordingly, something more than the Spending Clause seems necessary since the
state of Massachusetts argued not just that DOMA was unconstitutional as regards
those two programs; more broadly, Massachusetts’s complaint sought a declaration
“that section 3 of DOMA, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, is unconstitutional.”46
Congress’s need for constitutionally delegated authority to enact DOMA section 3,
however, is unlikely to render the law unconstitutional, for in form, DOMA closely
resembles another statute the constitutional basis for which the Supreme Court seems
to have assumed.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)47 applies
to nearly everything the federal government might do, requiring the government to
pass a compelling governmental interest test if it substantially burdens someone’s
exercise of religion.48  The House Committee on the Judiciary relied on the Necessary
and Proper Clause of Article I of the Constitution49 for congressional authority to
44 Massachusetts argued that in order to comply with federal laws concerning the state-
federal cooperative venture Medicaid and so avoid bearing the whole cost of administering
its public health program for low-income persons, and with federal laws concerning money
granted to states for burying eligible veterans and their children, and not have to pay back mil-
lions of dollars, it would have to discriminate against lawfully married same-sex couples in
violation of Massachusetts constitutional law. See Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 240–43.
45 Id. at 247.
46 Complaint, supra note 19, at 3 (emphasis added).
47 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2006)).
48 Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 & n.1
(2006) (asserting that “[u]nder RFRA, the Federal Government may not, as a statutory matter,
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, ‘even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability’” and noting that the Court had “held the application [of RFRA] to
States to be beyond Congress’ legislative authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)(2006))).
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
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make RFRA applicable to the federal government.50  The Necessary and Proper
Clause seems a slender reed for upholding RFRA or DOMA section 3, either of which
might (to mix metaphors) resemble a shotgun in its indiscriminate applicability to all
federal action.  Nevertheless, while everything the federal government does requires
a basis of authority in the Constitution, RFRA might be and has been understood as
simultaneously amending all federal laws that authorize the government to act.51 
Likewise, DOMA Section 3 could be understood, as its definitional terms suggest,
as relying upon each grant of authority that allows the federal government to act (in
ways dependent on marriage) in the first place.  Bongiorno, with its reading of the
Tenth Amendment as co-extensive with the requirement that the federal government
exercise only delegated powers, thus cannot do the service into which Judge Tauro
attempted to press it.
Moreover, Bongiorno does not even state that it was announcing a test suffi-
cient to identify Tenth Amendment violations.  After rejecting the defendant’s Tenth
Amendment challenge because Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the
CSRA, the Court of Appeals offered an alternative basis for rejecting the argument.52 
Bongiorno insisted that “a Tenth Amendment attack on a federal statute cannot suc-
ceed without three [specified] ingredients,” one of which the case clearly lacked.53 
The court thus had no occasion to hold that those three necessary elements would
suffice to establish a Tenth Amendment violation.  Nor should this conclusion of logic
be dismissed as mere hairsplitting, particularly because Bongiorno’s only authority
for those necessary elements was the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,54 whose analysis the Supreme
Court repudiated four years later (almost twelve years before Bongiorno) in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,55 to which I shall return in Part II.
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”).
50 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (“Finally, the Committee believes that Congress
has the constitutional authority to enact [RFRA]. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, the legislative branch has been given the authority to provide statutory pro-
tection for a constitutional value . . . .”).
51 See, e.g., Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress derives its
ability to protect the free exercise of religion from its plenary authority found in Article I of
the Constitution; it can carve out a religious exemption from otherwise neutral, generally
applicable laws based on its power to enact the underlying statute in the first place.”).
52 United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1033 (1st Cir. 1997).
53 Id. at 1033–34. The three ingredients are: “(1) the statute must regulate the ‘States as
States,’ (2) it must concern attributes of state sovereignty, and (3) it must be of such a nature
that compliance with it would impair a state's ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions.’” Id. at 1033 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclaiming Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 287–88 (1981)).
54 452 U.S. at 287–88.
55 469 U.S. 528, 537–47 (1985).
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II. UNCATEGORICAL FEDERALISM ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECTION 3 OF DOMA
In contrast to the problematic categorical federalism arguments made by the
district court in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and Human
Services,56 there are uncategorical federalism arguments that can be made against
DOMA section 3.  These arguments are plausible in light of continued judicial adher-
ence to dual sovereignty.  Starting under the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court of the United States has been engaged in a campaign of federalism revitaliza-
tion, curtailing federal power in the name of state sovereignty in a variety of doctrinal
arenas: the extent of Congress’s Commerce Clause power;57 the scope of Congressional
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Section 5;58 the circumstances
under which there is federal authority to overcome state sovereign immunity protected
by the Eleventh Amendment and, the Court has said, our constitutional structure more
generally;59 and the impermissibility of federal commandeering of the legislative or
executive branches of state governments under the Tenth Amendment.60
56 698 F. Supp. 2d 243 (D. Mass. 2010).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (invalidating civil suit
provision of Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress’s power over interstate
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School
Zones Act as exceeding Congress’s power over interstate commerce).
58 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02 (invalidating civil suit provision of Violence
Against Women Act as exceeding Congress’s enforcement power); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (invalidating applicability of Religious Freedom Restoration Act to
state and local governments as exceeding Congress’s enforcement power). But cf. Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004) (sustaining public accommodations title of Americans with
Disabilities Act under Congress’s enforcement power as applied to court access); Nevada Dep’t
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003) (sustaining Family and Medical Leave Act
under Congress’s enforcement power).
59 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (holding
that employment discrimination provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act are not a
valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers and do not abrogate state sovereign immunity);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act is not a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers and does not
abrogate state sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding state
sovereign immunity valid even in state court against suit brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act passed by Congress under its commerce power); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (holding that state sovereign im-
munity is not overcome by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act enacted under Congress’s
commerce power); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 630 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity is not overcome by the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act enacted pursuant to Patent Clause and Interstate
Commerce Clause).
60 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot
commandeer state and local executive officers and force them to enforce federal laws); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer
state legislatures and force them to enact laws according to federal standards).
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I am not claiming that current case law ineluctably compels the conclusion that
section 3 of DOMA violates constitutional federalism principles.  Precedents can often
be distinguished,61 or even largely ignored if it’s the Supreme Court deciding a case,
as illustrated by the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,62 upholding the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 200363 in the face of the Court’s own invalidation
of Nebraska’s ban on so-called partial birth abortions seven years earlier in Stenberg
v. Carhart.64  But where things stand now, there is ample room, whether in the public
eye, legislative halls, or even litigation, to advance an interpretation of the Constitution
and federalism that would hold section 3 of DOMA to lie beyond Congress’s consti-
tutional authority.  In their most modest and thus probably most plausible forms, the
arguments would tend to be less categorical in nature than that in Massachusetts v.
United States Department of Health and Human Services appears.65  Instead, the argu-
ment would rely on a confluence of features about section 3 to adjudge it unconstitu-
tional.  There are additional federalism-related arguments against the constitutionality
of various applications of section 3, such as arguments that it works in tandem with
certain federal programs to violate limits on conditional spending by Congress, which
were made by the state in Massachusetts.66  But this Essay primarily addresses argu-
ments about the possible facial unconstitutionality of section 3.  So, then, what are the
concerns that may render section 3 unconstitutional on federalism grounds?
61 Cf. David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence,
and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 327 (2000) (“Romer v. Evans may
indicate that Hardwick is on its way to being overruled or distinguished into practical oblivion.”
(footnote omitted)).
62 550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007).
63 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
64 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000).
65 See 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).
66 Id. at 247. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), held that for conditional spending
measures enacted by Congress to be constitutional,
(1) it must be in pursuit of the “general welfare,” (2) conditions of
funding must be imposed unambiguously, so states are cognizant of the
consequences of their participation, (3) conditions must not be “unre-
lated to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs”
funded under the challenged legislation, (4) the legislation must not be
barred by other constitutional provisions, and (5) the financial pressure
created by the conditional grant of federal funds must not rise to the
level of compulsion.
Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at
207–08, 211), quoted in Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 247. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts argued that the interaction of DOMA and spending programs such as Medicaid
and the State Cemetery Grants Program impermissibly induces states to deny same-sex couples
equal protection, in violation of the fourth listed requirement from Dole. Massachusetts, 698
F. Supp. 2d at 248 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 210). The strength of such narrow as-applied
arguments is beyond the scope of this Essay.
2011]     THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT AND UNCATEGORICAL FEDERALISM 815
First and foremost, as the Massachusetts plaintiffs and the district court argued,
section 3 of DOMA operates within the sphere of “domestic relations.”67  Section 3
provides that for the purposes of any Congressional Act or “any ruling, regulation,
or interpretation” of administrative agencies, “‘marriage’ means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, [while] ‘spouse’ refers only
to a person of the [so-called] opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”68  It thereby
defines the status relationships “marriage” and “spouses” and the status of being
“married” for a sweeping range of federal laws.  Yet marriage is one of the central
relationships in “domestic relations” law.69  And, as the district court recognized in
Massachusetts,70 “domestic relations” have long been said to be the proper province
of the states.71
Recall that at the time of adoption of the Constitution the states were governments
of general jurisdiction; exercising their recognized police power, they could enact any
statutes (not forbidden by state or later the federal Constitution) that they judged to
serve the public health, safety, welfare, or morals.72  The federal government, in
67 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 249–50 & n.156 (supporting this point
with quotations from or citations to United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000),
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 848 (1997), Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906),
overruled in part by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 287 (1942)); Complaint,
supra note 19, at 22 (“Congress lacks the authority under Article I of the United States
Constitution to regulate the field of domestic relations, including marriage.”).
68 Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
69 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 716 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“‘Domestic Relations’ actions are loosely classifiable into four categories. The first, or
‘core’ category involves declarations of status, e.g., marriage, annulment, divorce, custody,
and paternity.”).
70 698 F. Supp. 2d at 249–50 (stating that family law “is often held out as the archetypal
area of local concern”).
71 Elk Grove United Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (“One of the principal
areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic
relations.”); Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1930) (“If when the
Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of hus-
band and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty
in construing the instrument accordingly and not much in dealing with the statutes.”); Simms
v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“Within the States of the Union, the whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the State,
and not to the laws of the United States.”); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890) (“The
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of an alimony. . . .”).
72 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“There are, however, certain
powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed
police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the
courts. Those powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific
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contrast, however enhanced as its powers were under the Constitution compared to
the Articles of Confederation,73 was still a government only of delegated powers.74  It
enjoyed no general federal police power, no all-purpose authority to pass whatever
laws seemed sensible for the benefit of the national people.75  All power the federal
government exercises must be traced to an express or implied grant of authority in the
Constitution.76  And as the Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”77  The system of government contemplated by
the Constitution is said to be one of dual sovereignty;78 within the scope of its dele-
gated authority, the national government would be sovereign, supreme, but within the
scope of their retained authority, the states (or the people) would be sovereign.79
limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.”), overruled
in part on other ground by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
73 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (recounting that the
Framers of the Constitution “provid[ed] for a stronger central government” than obtained under
the Articles of Confederation).
74 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“Our national
government is one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the administration
of criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those
delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45,
at 328 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (“The powers delegated by
the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. . . . The powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people . . . .”).
75 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“The Constitution . . . withhold[s]
from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legis-
lation.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)).
76 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
78 David J. D’Addio, Comment, Dual Sovereignty and the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 113 YALE L.J. 1991, 1993 (2004) (explaining the concept of dual sovereignty).
79 See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[U]nder our federal system, the
States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government . . . .”); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918) (“The maintenance of the authority of the States over
matters purely local is as essential to the preservation of our institutions as is the conservation
of the supremacy of the federal power in all matters entrusted to the Nation by the Federal
Constitution.”), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405–06 (1819) (“[T]he government of the
Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. . . . The govern-
ment of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when
made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, ‘any thing in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’” (quoting the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 74, at 285 (James
Madison) (“[T]he local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of
the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.”).
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And one of the still paradigmatic cases of matters said to lie properly with the
states have been domestic relations.  As James Madison put it in The Federalist
papers: “The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people . . . .”80  In the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided cases since
taken as evidence that family law “has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive
province of the States.”81  And then in a frequently quoted assertion, the Court stated
near the end of that century that “[t]he whole subject of . . . domestic relations . . .
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”82
And this view is not merely a relic of the nineteenth century.  As World War II
was ending, the Supreme Court said in Williams v. North Carolina that the judiciary
must pay “due regard” to the “most important aspect of our federalism whereby ‘the
domestic relations of husband and wife . . . were matters reserved to the States,’ and
do not belong to the United States.”83  More recently, in United States v. Lopez in
1995, the Supreme Court invalidated part of the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act
as exceeding Congress’s commerce power.84  In explaining that it could not accept the
dissent’s reasoning because that would convert the Commerce Clause into a general-
purpose federal police power, the majority emphasized that, for example, under the
dissent’s approach, Congress would then have plenary authority over “family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody).”85  And for those who are more con-
cerned with litigation and therefore head-counting than a more pure constitutional
theory, it bears mention that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez insisted
that if Congress attempted to exercise power in ways that verge on asserting a general
police power, “at the least we must inquire whether the exercise of national power
seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern.”86  Even the Lopez dissenting
Justices were at pains to reject the conclusion that it was interpreting the Constitution
in a way to give the federal government authority over such domestic relations issues
as “marriage, divorce, and child custody.”87  And sliding into this century, the pro-
federalism majority of the Court for the same reasons as in Lopez invalidated the
civil suit provision of the Violence Against Women Act in 2000 in United States v.
80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 74, at 328 (James Madison).
81 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
582, 584 (1859)).
82 In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
83 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 233 (1945) (internal citation omitted).
84 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
85 Id. at 564.
86 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To hold this statute constitutional is not . . . to hold
that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government . . . to regulate marriage, divorce,
and child custody . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Morrison, again rejecting the dissent’s view because it would extend congressional
authority to “family law and other areas of traditional state regulation . . . .”88
The idea that the Tenth Amendment reserves certain subject matters to the states,
acting as a constitutionally independent restriction on exercise of authority that the
federal government otherwise would seemingly be given by the Constitution, has had
a checkered past.  It was this view that animated the Supreme Court’s short-lived effort
in National League of Cities v. Usery to stop federal law from reaching into “integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions . . . .”89  Thereafter the
Justices of the Supreme Court as well as lower federal court judges were not able to
agree on what such functions were or how they should be identified.90
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association91 relied on by
the First Circuit in United States v. Bongiorno92 in 1997, the decision upon which the
district court in Massachusetts grounded its Tenth Amendment ruling,93 was decided
during the years following National League of Cities.  Summarizing the dictates of
National League of Cities, Hodel held that
four conditions must be satisfied before a state activity may be
deemed immune from a particular federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause.  First, . . . the federal statute at issue must regu-
late the States as States.  Second, the statute must address matters
that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty.  Third, state
compliance with the federal obligation must directly impair [the
States’] ability to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions.  Finally, the relation of state and
federal interests must not be such that the nature of the federal
interest . . . justifies state submission.94
Ultimately, however, National League of Cities was overruled in 1985 in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.95  In particular, Garcia specifically
88 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
89 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
90 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985) (“We find it
difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle [distinguishing lower court
decisions holding certain functions do or do not meet National League of Cities test].”); id.
(“Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental
functions deemed protected under National League of Cities.”).
91 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
92 106 F.3d 1027, 1033 (1st Cir. 1997).
93 Massachusetts v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249 (D. Mass.
2010).
94 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537 (1985) (quoting and citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287–88 & n.29)
(internal quotation marks and alterations made by Garcia omitted).
95 Id. at 557.
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repudiated National League of Cities’ cloaking of states with immunity from federal
power over integral operations in areas of states’ “traditional governmental functions.”96 
Garcia confirmed the impropriety “of making immunity turn on a purely historical
standard of ‘tradition . . . .’”97  In the majority’s view, based on past experience with
related doctrines, “[a] nonhistorical standard for selecting immune governmental func-
tions is likely to be just as unworkable as is a historical standard.”98
More fundamentally, the Court reasoned,
neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other that
purports to separate out important governmental functions can be
faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society.  The
essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority
left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally
free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the
common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone
else—including the judiciary—deems state involvement to be. 
Any rule of state immunity that looks to the traditional, integral,
or necessary nature of governmental functions inevitably invites
an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.99
Garcia, therefore,
reject[ed], as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice,
a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function
is “integral” or “traditional.”  Any such rule leads to inconsistent
results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic
self-governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it
is divorced from those principles.100
Current doctrine thus does not recognize the Tenth Amendment as a font of
categorical free-floating subject matter limitations on federal power.  To the extent
the district court in Massachusetts read Bongiorno to hold to the contrary,101 it was
96 Id. at 537–38.
97 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543.
98 Id. at 545.
99 Id. at 545–46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 Id. at 546–47.
101 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249
(D. Mass. 2010) (relying on Bongiorno for “traditional governmental functions” test).
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mistaken, and its categorical approach thus without adequate foundation in contem-
porary constitutional law.102
It is true that in Gregory v. Ashcroft the Supreme Court subsequently held that
because application of federal law to displace state limitations on the age of state judges
would “alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,’ [Congress] must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.’”103  This clear statement rule was designed to protect state
sovereignty, but, importantly, it did so only through the Court’s approach to inter-
preting federal statutes.104  Indeed, the Gregory majority explicitly adhered to the
102 Massachusetts recognized that the Supreme Court repudiated “traditional governmental
functions” analysis in Garcia, yet it claimed that New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
159 (1992), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000), “revive[d] the
concept of using the Tenth Amendment to police intrusions on the core of sovereignty retained
by the state.” Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 252 n.154. This is a flat overreading of those
cases. New York, to the extent that it preserves some “core of sovereignty retained by the States
under the Tenth Amendment,” New York, 505 U.S. at 159, does so not by staking out a cate-
gorical subject matter as lying beyond federal power, cf. id. (noting that those challenging the
Act of Congress did “not contend that Congress lacks the power to regulate the disposal of low
level radioactive waste”), but by interpreting the Constitution to impose a process limitation
that forbids the federal government from commandeering state legislatures. Id. at 161. New
York’s reliance on Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S.
264 (1981), went no further than reading that case to insist that federal laws not “commandeer”
state governments to enact regulation or enforce federal laws. New York, 505 U.S. at 161. It did
not resuscitate “traditional governmental functions” analysis.
Likewise, neither Morrison nor United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), on which
Morrison built, purports to identify in the Constitution any subject matters over which Congress
is deprived of the power to regulate if doing so would interfere with state regulations. Although
Lopez rejects expansive interpretations that would effectively transform the Commerce Clause
into a police power letting Congress pass any law it deems prudent, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564
(“Under the theories that the Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power . . . .”); id. at 566 (“The Constitution . . . withhold[s]
from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legis-
lation.”), even “in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically
have been sovereign,” id. at 564, it does not categorically hold that Congress may not regulate
states in such areas if it interferes with their regulations. Rather, Lopez holds that Congress may
not aggregate the effect on interstate commerce of non-economic, violent criminal activity.
Id. at 561, 567; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (“We accordingly reject the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely
on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a dis-
tinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.” (citing, inter alia, Lopez, 514
U.S. at 568)).
103 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
104 Id.; accord United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 610 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hen faced with two plausible interpretations of a federal criminal statute, we generally
will take the alternative that does not force us to impute an intention to Congress to use its full
commerce power to regulate conduct traditionally and ably regulated by the States.” (citing,
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view that “[a]s long as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution,
Congress may impose its will on the States.  Congress may legislate in areas tradi-
tionally regulated by the States.”105
In addition to the foregoing, it remains a fact that over our nation’s history the
federal government has adopted various laws that do regulate particular aspects of
family law.106  Hence, it is probably best under current law to conceive of the rele-
vance of the fact that section 3 of DOMA operates in the area of domestic relations,
an area traditionally subject to state regulation, as merely a factor or consideration in
assessing section 3’s constitutionality—how Justice Souter’s dissent in United States
v. Morrison107 understood the majority to be treating it in that case108—rather than a
categorical bar to federal authority.
Current Tenth Amendment doctrine does recognize certain categorical limitations
on federal authority that are conceptually separate from the fact that grants of congres-
sional power have their own definitions and therefore inherent limits.  In New York
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth Amendment affirmatively
prohibited Congress from exercising its commerce power (or other delegated powers)
in ways that would commandeer a state legislature, forcing it to legislate to federal
liking.109  And in Printz v. United States, a majority of the Court held that the Tenth
Amendment likewise prohibited Congress from exercising its powers in ways that
commandeered state executive officers, commanding them to enforce or administer fed-
eral programs.110  Hence, wholly aside from the subject matter of an act of Congress,
the form that federal legislation takes is, under current law, a relevant and important
factor in analyzing such legislation for consistency with the Constitution’s federal-
ism limitations.
inter alia, United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411–12 (1973))); id. at 610–11 (“These
clear statement rules, however, are merely rules of statutory interpretation, to be relied upon
only when the terms of a statute allow, and in cases implicating Congress’s historical reluc-
tance to trench on state legislative prerogatives or to enter into spheres already occupied by the
States. They are rules for determining intent when legislation leaves intent subject to question.”
(citations omitted)).
105 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
106 Many of these areas are usefully addressed in Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1373–76 (1998). In this article, Professor
Hasday concludes “that federal Reconstruction massively intervened into family law[,]” and
that even “in the years since” Reconstruction, “a survey of just a few prominent examples
of modern federal regulation reveals that federal family law is far-reaching . . . .” Id. at
1299–1300.
107 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
108 Id. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Where such decisions [as, for example, National
League of Cities] once stood for rules, today’s opinion points to considerations [of traditional
state regulation] by which substantial effects [on interstate commerce, and thus Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause,] are discounted.”).
109 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175, 188 (1992).
110 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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Here then is another point of constitutional vulnerability of section 3 of DOMA.
It does not take a particular federal power, such as authority over immigration (an
unenumerated federal power, by the way111), and decide to adopt a particular federal
vision of social and legal relations for purposes of some discrete enactment.  Prior
to 1996 and DOMA, Congress had never enacted a law that purported to define
family status for the purpose of all federal law.112  With the enactment of section 3
of DOMA, Congress created a type of federal family law that is very different from
the definitional sections of individual statutes, which apply only within the boundaries
of those statutes.113
Although the statutory language of section 3 is blunt, comprehensive, and fairly
clear, the clear statement approach to protecting state sovereignty from Gregory v.
Ashcroft is still instructive as to the constitutionality vel non of that section of DOMA. 
Gregory presupposes that a statute cannot be taken to upset deep-seated balances of
authority between federal and state governments absent reassurance that Congress
has deliberately concluded that a particular disregard of state sovereignty is justified
by an overarching federal need in that particular context.114  That is plainly not the
case with section 3.  In discussing DOMA, Congress did not separately take up each
of the hundreds of federal laws that turn on marital status, or even functionally similar
federal laws, and decide that in each one there was a federal need to disregard some
aspect of the state laws that had in most instances always provided the definition of
marriage used by the federal government.  Rather, DOMA’s asserted purpose is to
provide a clear definition of marriage and to protect the “institution of traditional
heterosexual marriage.”115
This in turn implicates further factors that might be judged relevant to assessing
the consistency or lack thereof of section 3 with our constitutional federalism.  Al-
though one can point to numerous federal statutes that touch on domestic relations,
they have generally done so in somewhat limited ways.  As Justice Blackmun sum-
marized in a concurring opinion in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, a 1992 Supreme Court
111 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–09 (1889) (inferring
federal authority over immigration from nature of national sovereignty).
112 Matthew Fry, Comment, One Small Step for Federal Taxation, One Giant Leap for
Same-Sex Equality: Revising § 2702 of the Internal Revenue Code to Apply Equally to All
Marriages, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 545, 555 (2008) (“The 1996 DOMA provided, for the first time
in our nation’s history, a federal definition of ‘marriage’ and ‘spouse.’”).
113 See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (defining
“parent” specifically for the purposes of the Act at 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (limiting definitions to
“[a]s used in this subchapter.”)).
114 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (“In traditionally sensitive areas, such as
legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the
legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in
the judicial decision.” (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
115 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
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decision about the scope of the domestic relations exception from federal court juris-
diction (itself another piece of evidence of the proper allocation of domestic relations
in our constitutional order):
“Domestic relations” actions are loosely classifiable into four
categories.  The first, or “core” category involves declarations of
status, e.g., marriage, annulment, divorce, custody, and paternity. 
The second, or “semicore,” category involves declarations of rights
or obligations arising from status (or former status), e.g., alimony,
child support, and division of property.  The third category con-
sists of secondary suits to enforce declarations of status, rights,
or obligations.  The final, catchall category covers the suits not
directly involving status or obligations arising from status but that
nonetheless generally relate to domestic relations matters, e.g., tort
suits between family or former family members for sexual abuse,
battering, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.116
Section 3 is a definitional statute adopted by Congress to operate in the “core” of the
area of domestic relations, not just for one or more specific federal programs, but for
all purposes, both present and future.  For that reason, it might be seen as a greater
upset of the prevailing balance of federal and state authority and thus more likely
unconstitutional on federalism grounds.
Moreover, it may matter that Congress is acting to try to define “marriage” with
section 3 of DOMA.  Section 3 is dramatically in tension with section 2, the interstate
non-recognition portion of DOMA.  Section 2 purports to authorize states to deny faith
or credit
to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.117
It was justified in Congress as a pro-state, pro-federalism measure, designed to ensure
the primacy of each state over marriage.118  Yet section 3 selectively disregards the
very state definitions of marriage supposedly safeguarded by section 2,119 substituting
116 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 716 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117 Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
118 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2, 12 (1996) (asserting that one of the “primary purposes”
of DOMA “is to protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding
the legal recognition of same-sex unions”).
119 Id. at 25, 30.
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a national marriage definition for virtually any federal purpose insofar as a same-sex
couple lawfully married by a state is concerned.120
Section 3 leaves in place state marriage definitions for federal purposes regardless
of how young or old a putative spouse is.  It leaves in place state marriage definitions
regardless of what diseases or genetic conditions a person might have.  It leaves in
place state marriage definitions regardless of how closely related the two spouses might
be.  But if a state marriage definition embraces a same-sex couple, section 3 means
that the federal government will suddenly and across-the-board refuse to use the state
definition.  Indeed, section 3 defines such a couple as not married.121  And herein lies
another vice that could be argued to contribute to the conclusion that section 3 is
unconstitutional on federalism grounds.
Massachusetts argued in court that “Congress is not required to make marital
status relevant to federal law.  Having chosen to do so, however, it must take marital
status as the States define it; it cannot declare that some marriages valid under State
law are federally valid whereas others are not.”122  In effect, section 3 in tandem with
section 2 arguably engages the federal government in a constitutional charade, whereby
it accepts that the definition of marital status or relationships is properly a matter of
state competence and so governs for almost all federal purposes but then pretends that
certain couples are not married when the same competent state law has allowed a
same-sex couple to marry.  This is akin to one understanding of the vices of two vin-
tage Supreme Court decisions, Chisholm v. Georgia123 from the eighteenth century
and United States v. Klein124 from the nineteenth.
Chisholm was the 1793 Supreme Court case that led to the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment (about the limited reach of federal judicial power over states
in diversity suits, later interpreted as being about state sovereign immunity).  In
Chisholm, the Supreme Court basically held that a creditor could sue Georgia on a
Georgia state law contract claim in federal court because of diversity jurisdiction, and
that Georgia could not interpose sovereign immunity as a defense to such suit.125  One
objection to this that scholars have raised is that the Court was basically allowing
suits to enforce state law, but only highly selectively: the state law cause of action
(contract) was enforceable federally, but the state law defense (sovereign immunity)
was not federally enforceable.126
120 Id. at 30.
121 See Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
122 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint and
in Support of Commonwealth’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 9, at 14 (defining
“marriage” as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife” but
making no mention of age requirements).
123 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
124 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
125 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451–52 (opinion of Blair, J.) (reaching this conclusion,
in the first of four seriatim opinions upholding a private suit against Georgia in federal court).
126 PETER W. LOW & JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
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The Eleventh Amendment was rapidly adopted to reverse the outcome of
Chisholm.127  Its interpretation has been a matter of dispute.  What has been termed
“the diversity interpretation”128 of the Amendment reads it in a way that limits the
power of the federal judiciary to pick and choose among elements of state law by
eliminating (at least part of) the diversity jurisdiction employed in Chisholm to allow
suit against the state of Georgia.  This diversity approach to the Eleventh Amendment,
although probably only currently subscribed to by a minority of Justices, is thus lim-
ited in a way that makes it responsive to the state law selectivity objection, and this
view is the one with the most academic and historical support.129
United States v. Klein130 offers another precedent for this kind of objection to the
constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA.  Klein is a case most familiar to federal courts
scholars and perhaps those with substantial litigation practices challenging congres-
sional action on federalism grounds.  Klein involved a statute passed by Congress in
the wake of the civil war to deny rights to seized property or compensation to those
claiming loyalty to the Union only by virtue of presidential pardon.131  Congress had
not changed the underlying property compensation act, which the Supreme Court had
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 779 (1987) (recounting the view of Eleventh Amendment as
limiting federal judicial power because in Chisholm, “in enforcing a state-created cause of
action, the Court set aside the accompanying state law of sovereign immunity”).
127 For an extensive historical account of the context, including the decision in Chisholm,
of the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12–27 (1987).
128 See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vásquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden
Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1931 n.19 (2000).
129 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); ORTH, supra note 127, at 12–27;
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473 (1987); Martha
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional
Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Martha Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
515 (1978); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1262–64 (1989); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant
of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983);
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 44 (1988); James E. Pfander,
History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1329, 1336, 1339 (1998); Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment
and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260, 1261 (1990).
130 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
131 Id. at 143; accord Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution,
86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2525 (1998).
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interpreted to render such persons eligible for compensation.132  Instead, Congress
attempted specifically to rule certain kinds of loyalty (legal loyalty) out of bounds.133
As Dean Larry Sager of the University of Texas School of Law summarizes:
What seems to worry the Court in Klein is that Congress left stand-
ing the operative rule (persons who did not give aid and comfort to
the rebellion are entitled to recover), but stipulated how the Court
was to construe the receipt of a presidential pardon (as conclusive
proof that the recipient gave aid and comfort).134
And this was a problem because,
[i]n effect, Congress attempted to conscript the judiciary in a con-
stitutional charade.  The Supreme Court and the Court of Claims
were to behave as though they regarded recipients of presidential
pardons as convicted rather than cleansed of the delict of aiding
and abetting the rebellion by their very acceptance of the pardon,
notwithstanding the Court’s diametrically opposed judgment. . . . 
At the heart of the Klein decision was the Justices’ refusal to allow
Congress to cast them in this false light.135
Section 3 of DOMA acts analogously.  In conjunction with Section 2, it commits
the federal government to act as though state law determines marriage, but it rede-
fines certain couples from Massachusetts, California (where same-sex couples were
able to marry civilly for several months in 2008), Iowa, Connecticut, Vermont, New
Hampshire, and the District of Columbia as unmarried.  And it attempts to do so for
nearly any federal purpose.  It effectively deploys the power of the federal govern-
ment to try to keep people from viewing same-sex couples as married, regardless of
the state law that makes them so, law that the federal government generally embraces. 
It does so even though marriage is a matter long and widely said to remain primarily
and properly under state authority;136 even though Congress was unwilling to amend
DOMA in proffered ways to deal with arguably greater “threats” to marriage than
same-sex couples committing their lives to each other;137 and even though Congress
132 Id. at 131.
133 Id.
134 Sager, supra note 131, at 2526.
135 Id. at 2528.
136 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (stating, in the context of
divorce, “[e]ach state as sovereign has a rightful an legitimate concern in the marital status
of persons domiciled within its borders”).
137 See, e.g., David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It Marriage”: The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 949–50 (2001) (recounting
rhetoric of “threats” and “attacks” in congressional debates over DOMA).
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did not when adopting DOMA detail the federal legal landscape and make considered
choices about the precise circumstances under which continuing its age-old reliance
on state law definitions in the domestic relations arena was intolerable.  And in doing
so, it casts Massachusetts state law in a false light, as if it did not really allow same-
sex couples to marry, particularly where state/federal cooperative programs may be
at issue.138
Section 3 of DOMA is thus marked by several features that render it constitu-
tionally suspect.  It is a federal law that operates in the core of the field of domestic
relations, an arena historically and to this day still frequently said to be the near-
exclusive preserve of state authority.  It operates not in discrete operational settings
carefully judged by Congress to require federal displacement of state law definitions
of marital status, but across the board in virtually any area in which the federal gov-
ernment acts.  It purports to be a definitional statute, but it selectively defines as not
married couples (of the same-sex) who are in fact married under state laws that the
federal government otherwise uses for determining people’s marital status,139 thus
casting egalitarian state laws and couples who have taken advantages of them in a
false light.  Taken all together, these factors arguably establish that DOMA violates
constitutional federalism principles, even if not for the categorical reason seemingly
relied on by the District Court in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health
and Human Services140 and to a perhaps lesser extent by the state of Massachusetts
in that case.
CONCLUSION
The so-called Defense of Marriage Act is an unconstitutional Act of Congress. 
As one who understands the United States, its Constitution, and our political order
under that constitution to be deeply if yet to a significant degree aspirationally egali-
tarian, I would lay stress on the way in which DOMA inflicts gratuitous injury on
same-sex couples, marking lesbigay persons and their relationships as inferior to
heterosexually identified Americans and their relationships in the service of sectar-
ian religious views141 and bare prejudices.142  The statute thus dramatically derogates
138 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing programs at issue before Judge
Tauro).
139 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 250
(D. Mass. 2010) (“There is a historically entrenched tradition of federal reliance on state
marital status determinations.”).
140 Id. at 253.
141 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7486 (1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer) (“We as legislators
and leaders for the country are in the midst of a chaos, an attack upon God’s principles.”).
142 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7482 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (“The very foun-
dations of our society are in danger of being burned. The flames of hedonism, the flames of
narcissism, the flames of self-centered morality are licking at the very foundations of our
society: the family unit.”).
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from the equal protection principles binding upon the federal government under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Yet the discrimination against lesbigay people is not the only way that DOMA
deviates from prevailing constitutional arrangements, and even people who are not
as committedly egalitarian as I am may have constitutional reasons to object to it. 
Section 3 is perhaps perversely anti-federalist in its terms and operation, particularly
now that such a significant portion of the United States populace lives in states (and
the District of Columbia) that allow same-sex couples to marry civilly or recognize
such marriages from other jurisdictions.  This unprecedented statutory provision may
well violate constitutional federalism principles.  If it is so adjudged, though, it should
not be because of a categorical claim that only states and not the federal government
can regulate domestic relations in general or marriage in particular.  Rather, as this
Essay has shown, the intrusion into the field of domestic relations is just one of mul-
tiple factors that together can uncategorically suggest that section 3 of DOMA, the
federal definition portion of the Act, offends constitutional federalism limitations.
